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ABSTRACT: The efficient markets hypothesis implies that arbitrage opportunities in markets such as 
those for foreign exchange (FX) would be, at most, short-lived. The present paper surveys the 
fragmented nature of FX markets, revealing that information in these markets is also likely to be 
fragmented. The “quant” workforce in the hedge fund featured in The Fear Index novel by Robert 
Harris would have little or no reason for their existence in an EMH world. The four currency 
combinatorial analysis of arbitrage sequences contained in Cross, Kozyakin, O’Callaghan, Pokrovskii 
and Pokrovskiy (2012) is then considered. Their results suggest that arbitrage processes, rather than 
being self-extinguishing, tend to be periodic in nature. This helps explain the fact that arbitrage 
dealing tends to be endemic in FX markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An arbitrage operation involves taking advantage of discrepancies in the prices at which a particular 
good or asset can be bought or sold, such operations being distinct from speculation in that they 
involve minimal risk or capital exposure. In the economics and finance literature the “law of one 
price” postulates that the exploitation of opportunities to profit from arbitrage, if buying prices are 
lower than selling prices, will lead goods or assets that are in some sense ”identical” to have the 
same price. 
The present paper focuses on arbitrage operations in foreign exchange (FX) markets. The Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS 2011, p. 5) offers a useful distinction between different arbitrage 
strategies in FX markets. Classical arbitrage exploits differences between quoted exchange rates and 
the exchange rates implied by no-arbitrage conditions, such as that cross-exchange rates are 
consistent with the exchange rates for currency pairs. Latency arbitrage takes advantage of time lags 
between market-moving trades being initiated and market-makers updating their FX price quotes. 
Liquidity imbalance strategies aim to detect order book imbalances for currency pairs and pricing 
discrepancies between different trading platforms. Complex event processing aims to exploit 
properties of foreign exchange rates such as momentum, mean-reversion, correlation with other 
exchange rates or reaction to news releases. The present paper focuses on classical arbitrage 
strategies. 
Section 1 of this paper considers the institutional context in which FX arbitrage strategies can be 
executed. In contrast to the textbook fiction of a single FX market, there are a variety of FX trading 
platforms distinguished not only by geographical location and time zone but also by the means by 
which transactions are executed. Electronic FX trading platforms have grown in importance in the 
last decade, but a substantial proportion of transactions are still conducted by banks dealing directly 
with end-user customers. This leads to a contrast between the “lit” areas, where information on FX 
quotes and trades is publically available on some of the electronic trading platforms; and the “dark 
pools”, where information on customer-direct transactions is initially private. A further contrast is 
between the human and computer elements. At one extreme are arbitrage strategies formalised in 
computer algorithms and executed by computer algorithms. At the other extreme are trades where 
humans are in the strategy and execution driving seats. So the notion of a single FX market is more 
fiction than fact. 
Section 2 considers the account given of FX markets by the efficient markets hypothesis (EHM) that 
came to be the conventional academic wisdom as to how financial markets work. The EMH 
postulates that prices, such as those in markets for FX, will fluctuate randomly if they incorporate 
the information and expectations of all market participants (Samuelson 1965). Weak, semi-strong 
and strong variants of the EMH are distinguished (Fama 1970) depending on whether the 
information available involves just the past history of market prices; other publically available 
information as well; or privately available information as well. If the EMH held in its strong form, 
opportunities to profit from arbitrage would be fleeting and would not persist in the absence of 
continuing information surprises (Fisher 1989). We argue that the EHM belies too many facts for 
comfort. 
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Section 3 considers the account of financial markets in the novel The Fear Index (Harris 2011). In this 
thriller a particle physicist leaves his research post at the Large Electron-Positron Collider at CERN, 
Geneva to become a “quant”, partnering a banker to set up a hedge fund based on an algorithmic-
learning trading strategy. The fictional VIXAL-4 fund makes huge profits by complex event processing 
arbitrage based on algorithms “learning” how fear indices affect asset prices. Aspects of the 
psychology and neuroscience literature dealing with financial markets are considered in an attempt 
to identify a factual basis for this novel. 
Section 4 considers classical arbitrage sequences in FX markets. The starting point is a three-
currency world in which one arbitrage transaction suffices to exploit and eliminate FX price 
discrepancies. The results for a four-currency world are then discussed, the periodicity implications 
of the combinatorial analysis of arbitrage sequences in asynchronous systems in Cross, Kozyakin, 
O’Callaghan, Pokrovskii and Pokrovskiy (2012) being highlighted. The implications of moving to a five 
or higher order currency world Cross and Kozyakin (2012) are then considered. The Financial Times 
provides daily quotes for fifty-two currencies, so the higher order currency worlds are worthy of 
consideration. 
Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.  
SECTION 1: FX MARKETS 
The Bank for International Settlements conducts a triennial survey that provides useful 
documentation on global FX market activity (BIS 2010). The UK is the dominant location for FX 
market activity, accounting for 37% of global turnover, followed by the US (18%), EMU countries 
(10%), Japan (6%), Singapore (5%), Switzerland (5%), Hong Kong (5%) and Australia (4%). There tends 
to be a “home bias” between the different time zones, most trades initiated in the US and Canada 
occurring during North American trading hours, most trades initiated in Japan and Australia taking 
place during Asian trading hours, and UK-initiated trades tending to be bunched in the overlapping 
Europe-North America and Asia-Europe trading hours (D’Souza 2008, Table 2).  
FX trades involving the (US) dollar account for 85/200 of all trades, followed by the euro (39/200), 
yen (19/200) and sterling (13/200), so trades involving these four currencies account for 78% of 
global turnover (BIS 2010, p. 12). In terms of currency pairs the dollar-euro accounts for 28% of 
global turnover, followed by the dollar-yen (14%), dollar-sterling (9%), euro-yen (3%), euro-sterling 
(3%) and sterling-yen (0.5%), so these six pairs account for 57.5% of global turnover (BIS 2010, p. 15). 
Triangular arbitrage operations involving these currency pairs are considered in the four-currency 
case analysed in Section 4 of this paper. 
Over the last decade there has been a substantial increase in the proportion of FX transactions that 
are executed electronically (BIS 2010, p. 16). Electronic broking systems, such as the London-based 
EBS and Reuters, accounted for 18.8% of turnover. Multi-bank electronic communication networks 
(ECNs) such as the US-based Currenex, Hotspot FX and FXall, accounted for 11.1% of turnover, with 
single-bank ECNs accounting for 11.4% of global turnover. Most inter-dealer trades are also 
executed electronically, accounting for 18.5% of turnover. The non-electronic execution part of the 
market is made up of customer-direct transactions, where banks deal directly with end-user clients, 
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accounting for 24.3% of turnover; and voice broker transactions, which hark back to the method of 
executing transactions by telephone, which was the predominant method of executing FX 
transactions until the late 1980s, taking 15.9% of turnover (BIS 2010, p. 16). 
In the 1990s electronic trading was confined to the inter-dealer section of the FX market. The growth 
of electronic trading in the 2000s has seen the emergence of new trading platforms and new 
participants in FX markets. The growth of high-frequency trading (HFT) has been one of the most 
notable developments. Algorithms can be used to execute trades, such as by “splitting trades to 
minimise the footprint on the market” (BIS 2011, p. 3); or to make trading strategy decisions with 
the algorithm being a classical arbitrage, latency arbitrage, liquidity imbalance or complex event 
processing model. 
HFT firms use algorithms for decision-taking as well as execution of FX trades. The latency, that is the 
delay between the transmission of information from a source and the reception at its destination, of 
HFT trades can be less than a millisecond,      seconds – compared to around 150 milliseconds for 
a human blink (BIS 2011, p. 4). HFT firms trading FX tend to operate on high volumes and low 
margins. Access to infrastructure support is by prime brokerage arrangements with large investment 
banks, as is credit, though risk holding periods are “typically well under five seconds” (BIS 2011, p. 
1). On March 2011 the EBS introduced a fifth decimal to the pricing of the major currency pairs, this 
finer grain “pip” being easier to handle for the algorithms than for the human traders. The estimate 
is that automated HFT accounted for 24-30% of total spot FX turnover in 2010 (BIS 2011, p. 11).  
A pioneering study by Chaboud, Chiquoine, Hjalmarsson and Vega (2009) used one-second 
frequency data from the EBS platform to assess how computer and human-driven FX trades interact, 
distinguishing between computer-maker/computer taker, computer-maker/human-taker, human-
maker/computer-taker and human-maker/human-taker trades. They found that computer-driven 
trades tend to be more correlated than human-driven trades, suggesting that the algorithms 
employed are not very diverse. There was no evident relationship between computer-driven trades 
and higher exchange-rate volatility, and non-algorithmic order flow accounted for a higher share of 
the variance in FX trading returns than algorithmic order flow. 
SECTION 2: THE EMH AND FX MARKETS 
If the EMH holds, foreign exchange rates would fluctuate randomly provided that they fully 
incorporate the information and expectations of all market participants (Samuelson 1965). To test 
the EMH, auxiliary hypotheses need to be invoked to specify, inter alia, the information sets 
available. Fama (1970) distinguished three variants of the EMH that could be subjected to statistical 
tests. In the weak version only information about present and past values of, in this context, 
exchange rates is involved: so technical analysts or algorithms would not be able to make arbitrage 
profits by attempting to identify patterns in past exchange rate movements, or discrepancies 
between exchange rates for currency pairs and their cross-exchange rates. In the semi-strong form 
the EMH involves publicly available information about the “fundamentals” that determine exchange 
rates as well: so technical analysts and algorithms would not be able to profit from using 
macroeconomic news, order flow information available on electronic trading platforms or other 
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relevant driving forces when conducting arbitrage operations. In the strong variant of the EMH, 
privately available information is also reflected in actual exchange rates: so, for example, FX traders 
at an investment bank would not be able to make arbitrage profits by exploiting the order-flow 
information arising from FX trades conducted directly with end-user clients. 
Thus, under the weak version of the EMH, exchange rate movements should be random, and 
arbitrage possibilities arising from discrepancies between the exchange rates for currency pairs and 
their cross exchange rates would not exist. Under the semi-strong and strong variants of EMH, 
technical analysts or computer algorithms would not be able to detect systematic relationships 
between exchange rates and, respectively, public or public and private information sets. This raises 
the “arbitrage paradox” pointed out by Grossman and Stiglitz (1976). If arbitrage opportunities do 
not exist, FX market participants would not have any incentive to monitor exchange rate 
movements, in which case profitable arbitrage opportunities could well arise. The informal 
resolution of this paradox by adherents of the EMH is to suggest that arbitrage opportunities arise 
over short time intervals and are quickly eliminated. Given that the HFT firms can execute trades 
within a      second interval on electronic FX trading platforms, the short-time interval would have 
to be very short indeed. A further basic problem with the EMH is the “no trade” theorem (Grossman 
and Stiglitz 1980). If markets such as those for FX were informationally efficient, one would expect to 
observe periods in which transactions volumes vanished towards zero when there is no new 
information coming on stream. Instead FX transactions, although varying over time, remain 
substantial during quiescent market conditions.  
An influential paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983) produced evidence, for low-frequency exchange 
rate data, that models in which macroeconomic “fundamentals” drive exchange rates did not 
forecast any better than the EMH postulate that the changes are random. Engel and West (2005) 
showed that exchange rates would display something close to a random walk if the “fundamentals” 
followed an I(1) process and the factor for discounting future fundamentals was close to one. 
The microstructure literature on the FX market has focused attention on the role of order-flow 
information in explaining exchange rate changes. Some of this information is private, arising, for 
example, from FX transactions in which banks deal directly with end-user clients. Evans and Lyons 
(2005) showed that end-user order flow data can explain about 16% of the monthly spot rate 
variance between the dollar and the euro. Covrig and Melvin (2002) studied whether geographically 
local order flow conveys informational advantages. Until December 22, 1994 the Japanese FX market 
closed for lunch from 12.00 to 13.30 hours, Tokyo time. The authors found bunching of FX 
transactions before this lunchtime closure, and a significant tendency for foreign quotes for the yen-
dollar exchange rate to lag behind Tokyo quotes during this pre-lunch period. This suggests that 
Tokyo based traders were better informed, or that foreign-based traders believed this to be the 
case. Osler (2005) discovered significant effects of stop-loss order flows on minute-by-minute 
foreign exchange rate data, a stop-loss order being an instruction to buy(sell) at the FX platform’s 
spot rate once this has risen (fallen) to a pre-specified level. 
Studies of high frequency data on electronic trading platforms suggest that arbitrage trading profits 
could have been made, net of transactions costs. Data from the EBS platform were studied by 
Marshall, Treepongkaruna and Young (2007) to estimate triangular arbitrage opportunities between 
the dollar, euro, yen, sterling and Swiss franc during two-minute intervals. Estimated mean arbitrage 
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profits, net of bid-offer spreads and 0.2 basic point transaction fees, ranged from 2.8 to 3 basis 
points. Reuters platform data were used in Akram, Rime and Sarno (2008) to detect covered interest 
arbitrage (CIP) opportunities, where the CIP no-arbitrage condition is that the forward-spot 
exchange rate differential matches the interest rate differentials between similar assets with the 
same maturity. After taking account of transaction costs, the authors discovered numerous short-
lived deviations from the CIP condition that would have presented profitable arbitrage 
opportunities, and that the profit opportunities were large enough and of significantly long duration 
for traders to have exploited them with profit. 
SECTION 3: THE FEAR INDEX 
If the financial markets are informationally efficient, as the EMH postulates, it would not be possible 
to design investment strategies that would consistently outperform the market. In the EMH world it 
is difficult to explain the excess returns of the funds managed by the likes of Soros (1995), whose 
early investment ventures involved arbitrage between the US and European markets, and Buffett 
(see Lowenstein 2001). Such funds have not always outperformed indexed portfolios, but have 
shown a persistent tendency to do so. 
Samuelson, the co-founder of the EMH, pointed out that the EMH implies that “most portfolio 
decision makers should go out of business – take up plumbing, teach Greek, or help produce the 
annual GDP by serving as corporate executives… even if this advice to drop dead is good advice, it is 
obviously not counsel that will be eagerly followed” (1974, quoted in Bernstein 2007, p. 113). 
Samuelson himself did not follow the EMH counsel when, in 1970 he became a founder investor in 
Commodities Corporation, started by a Ph.D. graduate from Samuelson’s MIT. This fund used 
statistical models of supply and demand for commodities, collecting detailed information on 
weather conditions affecting cocoa harvests, for example, to forecast commodity prices (Mallaby 
2010, Ch. 3). As Samuelson later explained: ”Fama’s theory of the random walk and mine are not the 
same…. mine is that there are no easy pickings…. if you read the numerous papers I have written on 
the efficient markets hypothesis, you will realise it is not a dogma…. if you get information early, 
before it is widespread, you can’t help but get very rich” (Samuelson, February 5, 2008, interview 
quoted in Mallaby 2010, p. 418). 
If the EMH were true, and there were no persistent arbitrage profits to be made in financial markets 
such as those for FX, it is difficult to explain the existence of “quants”, mathematicians and physicists 
employed by financial institutions to detect patterns in the processes determining financial asset 
prices. The “quants” have formalised in algorithms the trends or tendencies that “chartists” tried to 
identify before the advent of powerful computers. A battalion of “quants” form the workforce in the 
hedge fund described in the novel The Fear Index (Harris 2011). This fund, Hoffmann Investment 
Technologies, has been set up by Alex Hoffmann, funded by a partnership with a former investment 
banker, Hugo Quarry. Hoffmann has a Ph.D. in physics from Princeton, and was employed on the 
Large Electron-Positron Collider project, the forerunner to the Large Hadron Collider, at CERN in 
Geneva, leaving under a cloud. 
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The VIXAL-4 fund operated by Hoffmann Investment Technologies has an investment strategy based 
on algorithms that identify patterns in the determination of asset prices, and also on algorithms to 
execute trades. A first innovation in the VIXAL-4 strategy is to “correlate recent market fluctuations 
with the frequency rate of fear-related words in the media – terror, alarm, panic, horror, dismay, 
dread, scare, anthrax, nuclear” (Harris 2011, p. 97). Trades are geared to the volatility index VIX, a 
measure of volatility in the Standard and Poor 500 index of US equity prices, tradable on the Chicago 
Board of Exchange. The second innovation is to allow the algorithmic trading strategy to evolve as 
new data emerges, as the market impact of the trades made is observed, and as the profit and losses 
associated with particular trades are revealed. Hence the evolution from VIXAL-1 to VIXAL-4 in the 
machine-learning algorithmic trading strategy. There is a Darwinian theme, the innovative use of 
fear indices being depicted through the lens of Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals (1872); and the use of evolutionary adaptation reflecting Darwin’s On the Origin of the 
Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859). 
Reading a novel raises the problem of distinguishing the factual basis from the fiction. In relation to 
FX arbitrage processes an intriguing question is whether the trading processes described in The Fear 
Index give a closer insight into what happens in actual FX markets than does the vision of this world 
provided by the EMH. In The Fear Index emotions play a key role in driving behaviour on financial 
markets, whereas in the EMH behaviour is driven by reason alone. In the novel the trading strategy 
algorithm adapts to changes in the market environment, whereas in the EMH there is no incentive to 
search for fitter trading strategies. 
The notion of rational economic man that underlies the description of financial markets provided by 
the EMH is difficult to square with much of the language used to describe such markets: market 
crashes, panic selling, herding, bull markets, bear markets, fear, market sentiment, optimism, 
pessimism and so on. The psychology literature is replete with examples of cognitive biases in the 
heuristics used by people when asked to trade on experimental markets, such as risk aversion, 
anchoring, framing, representativeness and over-confidence (Kahneman 2011). The neuroscience 
literature suggests that the amygdala, a part of the brain that plays a key role when there is a need 
to take account of both affective and cognitive responses when making decisions, is highly active 
when financial trading decisions are being made (Lo 2011). Sweat samples taken from traders on a 
London trading floor indicated that higher testosterone levels predicted greater profitability later in 
the trading day, and that cortisol levels were positively correlated with market volatility (Coates and 
Herbert 2008). When financial trading can be driven by emotions, the question arises of how the 
traders react to the profits or losses made. The adaptive markets hypothesis (Lo 2004) postulates 
that trading strategies evolve, with the “fitter” ones showing higher survival propensity. This is not 
too far from the trading world depicted in the early stages of The Fear Index – before the VIXAL-4 
fund finds its Nemesis. 
SECTION 4 – FX TRADING SEQUENCES 
In what follows we consider a particular type of classical arbitrage strategy that operates on 
discrepancies between the exchange rates for currency pairs and their cross-exchange rates. This 
means that we do not consider other classical arbitrage strategies, such as that based on deviations 
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from the covered interest parity (CIP) condition. Nor do we consider latency, liquidity imbalance or 
complex event processing arbitrage strategies. The focus is on the different combinations of 
arbitrage sequences that can be pursued, and on whether the pursuit of arbitrage transactions that 
are active, in the sense that they are profitable, leads to a no-arbitrage state in which there are no 
active arbitrage opportunities. The following exposition is based on Cross, Kozyakin, O’Callaghan, 
Pokrovskii and Pokrovskiy (2012). 
Three Currencies 
In a three-currency world arbitrage operations are reasonably straightforward. Let the currencies be 
the US dollar ( ), euro ( ) and sterling ( ), and their exchange rates ( ) be defined as the number of 
units of domestic currency required to buy (or sell – we ignore the bid-ask spread between exchange 
rates and transaction costs in what follows) one unit of foreign currency. So, for example    , is the 
number of dollars required to buy one euro. Thus, ignoring reciprocal exchange rates, the principal 
exchange rates are the triplet: 
                (1) 
Let there be three currency traders who, in line with the “home currency bias” evidence mentioned 
earlier in this paper, initially are aware only of the exchange rates involving their home currency. So, 
the dollar trader does not initially know the value of    , the euro trader is initially unaware of     
and the sterling trader is initially unaware of    . 
The condition for the dollar trader to conduct profitable arbitrage, when discovering that the euro-
sterling exchange rate is out of line with the dollar exchange rate, is: 
              (2) 
The dollar trader would then make an arbitrage profit by exchanging dollars for pounds and using 
the pounds to buy euros. This would continue until the new non-arbitrage exchange rate is reached: 
   
       
   
   
               (3) 
The euro trader would have an active arbitrage opportunity if he discovered that the dollar-sterling 
rate was such that: 
              (4) 
Here the euro trader would profit by exchanging euros for dollars and the dollars for sterling until a 
new no-arbitrage ensemble of exchange rate is established: 
               
       
   
   
   (5) 
Finally, the sterling trader could discover that the dollar-euro exchange rate is such that: 
              (6) 
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Here the sterling trader would profit by exchanging sterling for euros and the euros for dollars until a 
new no-arbitrage ensemble emerges: 
         
                        (7) 
In this three-currency world the order in which traders find information about active arbitrage 
opportunities matters, but one arbitrage operation, perhaps executed algorithmically to minimise 
market impact, would suffice to exploit and, by doing so, remove the profitable arbitrage 
opportunity. This is not too far from the EMH world in which active arbitrage opportunities are, at 
most, fleeting. The interesting question is whether this state of affairs pertains when a larger 
number of currencies are present. 
Four Currencies 
Let the fourth currency be the Japanese yen ( ). Then we have   
  principal exchange rates with R 
indicating this ensemble: 
                                   (8) 
The balanced set of exchange rates, in which no arbitrage opportunities exist, can be shown by 
inspection, to be: 
    
    
   
        
    
   
        
    
   
  (9) 
Again, it is assumed that each trader is initially aware only of the exchange rates for his home 
currency. So, for example, the dollar trader knows    ,     and     but not    ,     and    . 
The crucial issue in this four-currency world is the order in which traders discover information about 
profitable arbitrage opportunities. So, for example, if the first information about a cross-exchange 
rate arbitrage opportunity arrives in the form of the dollar trader finding out that the euro-sterling 
exchange rate is out of line with the rates for the dollar-euro and dollar-sterling currency pairs, then 
a dollar-euro-sterling (   ) arbitrage sequence will be exploited first. After the exploitation of this 
triangular arbitrage opportunity, which is denoted as     , a new ensemble of principal exchange 
rates would emerge: 
            
     
     
                                  (10) 
Where      
     
 indicates the new ensemble of exchange rates after an active arbitrage     , has 
been exploited. This new exchange rate ensemble would present new cross-exchange rate arbitrage 
opportunities to other traders. So the crucial difference between the three and four-currency case is 
that in the latter case a single arbitrage opportunity does not bring the FX market into a balanced 
ensemble of exchange rates in which no active arbitrage opportunities exist. The exploitation of one 
arbitrage opportunity has a “ripple” effect, the change in cross-exchange rates creating further 
arbitrage opportunities about which the other traders could become informed. 
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The number of possible triangular arbitrage operations possible in this four-currency case is 
  
      . These possible arbitrage operations are listed in Table 1, along with their activation 
conditions and the new exchange rates arising from their exploitation: 
Table 1: Lists of Arbitrages 
Number Arbitrage Activation condition Actions 
1                      
               
2                      
               
3                      
               
4                      
               
5                      
               
6                      
               
7                      
               
8                      
               
9                      
               
10                      
               
11                      
               
12                      
               
13                      
               
14                      
               
15                      
               
16                      
               
17                      
               
18                      
               
19                      
               
20                      
               
21                      
               
22                      
               
23                      
               
24                      
               
Source: Cross, Kozyakin, O’Callaghan, Pokrovskii and Pokrovskiy (2012). 
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The key question, then, is whether the “ripple” effects arising from the exploitation of an active 
arbitrage opportunity results in a sequence of active arbitrages that converge onto a no-arbitrage 
ensemble of exchange rates. Cross et. al. (2012) apply asynchronous systems analysis to investigate 
the way active arbitrage chains evolve. The key finding is that “rather than there being a smooth 
convergence to an ensemble of exchange rates with no arbitrage opportunities, the arbitrage 
operations may display periodicity and no necessary convergence on a cross-exchange rate law of 
one price” (Cross et. al. 2012, p. 252). This periodicity finding is interesting in several respects. It 
suggests that active arbitrage opportunities will continue to exist in markets such as those for FX. 
Rather than the exploitation of active arbitrage opportunities leading to their elimination, their 
exploitation is followed by “ripple “ effects that do not necessarily tend to fade away, new arbitrage 
opportunities being activated. 
Preliminary results (Cross and Kozyakin 2012) suggest that triangular arbitrage in a world of five or 
more currencies and traders involves more unstable behaviour in arbitrage chains than in the four-
currency case. In this higher currency-dimension world, exchange rates not only may display the 
periodicity arising in the four-currency case, “but also, what is surprising, may grow in accordance 
with the double exponential law” (Cross and Kozyakin 2012, p. 11). For instance, in the five-currency 
case exchange rates may grow as         
 
, where   is the number of arbitrage operations and   is a 
positive constant. When the number of currencies and currency-traders involved is greater than five 
then we face an effect of “inheritance of instability” taking place in the cases of four and five 
currencies. In this case one may observe all the types of behaviour of exchange rates described 
above: periodicity, growth with the exponential rate and growth in accordance with the double 
exponential law. 
SECTION 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The EMH postulates that financial markets are informationally efficient, so that price movements are 
essentially random. Applied to FX markets, the EMH implies that profitable arbitrage opportunities 
are, at most, short-lived. This paper has documented the fragmented nature of FX markets, the 
institutional fragmentation implying that the information about profitable arbitrage opportunities 
available to FX participants is also fragmented. Even on single electronic trading platforms there is 
evidence from historical data that triangular arbitrage operations would have been profitable, net of 
bid-ask spreads and transaction costs. 
In the world described by the EMH it is difficult to explain the existence of funds, such as the hedge 
fund in The Fear Index (Harris 2011), that employ “quants” to design algorithms to detect arbitrage 
opportunities. The problem here might be that the academic literature has failed to analyse the 
complexity of the combinations of possible arbitrage sequences in markets such as those for FX. The 
combinatorial analysis of such sequences is straightforward in a three-currency world. As shown in 
Cross, Kozyakin, O’Callaghan, Pokrovskii and Pokrovskiy (2012), in a four-currency world profitable 
arbitrage sequences tend to display periodicity. This finding helps to explain why arbitrage 
operations in markets such as those for FX are endemic rather than self-extinguishing. 
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